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Abstract
We analyse post-war Dutch migration to New Zealand. We document that history, reflect on analytical
and econometric modelling and then combine a sample of Dutch migrants in New Zealand with a
representative sample of Dutch in The Netherlands to estimate wage equations and the determinants of
the migration decision. We use the results for ex post evaluation of the migration decision.
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We analyse post-war Dutch migration to New Zealand. We document that history, reflect on analytical 
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1. Motivation and general framework 
 
Analyses of the economic situation of immigrants commonly focus on their situation in 
comparison to natives of the destination country. While this is a relevant perspective for research 
on the labour market in the receiving country, it is not the natural focus for the migrants 
themselves. One may assume that their decision to emigrate was not motivated by a comparison 
with natives in the destination country, but by comparing their perspectives at home with those 
for themselves in the destination country. The perceived welfare of natives in the destination 
country will no doubt affect the expectations of potential migrants. Still, their basic comparison 
will be between their own homeland position and the position in the destination country. In this 
paper, we propose to share that perspective. That will make the outlook quite similar to the 
standard approach in labour market (or geographical) mobility within a country: compare the 
alternatives of moving and non-moving and assess or explain the decision that has been made by 
the individual, i.e. to move or not to move.    
 
In this paper we will attempt to assess the consequences of migration decisions by Dutch 
migrants to New Zealand. Did they fare well? Was it a good decision to emigrate, or had they 
better stayed at home? Obviously a question that is easier posed than answered, because many 
factors can be important in the individuals' own assessment, and we may lack the information to 
take all these factors into account. There are many dimensions to such a comparison. The core of 
the decision is on the maximum attainable utility in each country, reflecting individuals' 
optimising behaviour. The optimisation should cover the full scope of individual choices: labour 
force participation, self-employment versus employment, type of job, labour effort, contribution 
to and benefits from the public sector (taxes, subsidies, social insurances, etc). The migration 
decision will relate to the individual's endowments and the opportunity to derive welfare from 
them in both countries: the social, economic and institutional framework, the uncertainty of 
realising potential, and tastes, including risk attitudes.  
 
The full conceptual framework is clearly too broad and wide-ranging to apply directly in a single 
estimation model. The data requirements are too extensive for structural estimates of individual 
decisions. Obviously, strong simplifications are inevitable. But one should keep this framework 
in mind when analysing the data and interpret estimation results. We will describe the history of 
Dutch migration to New Zealand in the next section, and then in section 3, we discuss some 
more formal modelling, in 4 we describe the data, in 5 we present an econometric model and in 6 
we discuss the results. In 7 we draw the conclusion to our lead question. We will stress that, 
although correcting for selectivity bias in estimated earnings seems an obvious necessity, it is 
actually a futile exercise in the present context. 
 
 
2. Postwar history of Dutch migration to New Zealand1
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Figure 1 shows the inflow of Dutch migrants into New Zealand in the postwar period (data from 
Priemus, 1997). In the late forties, there was a somewhat complicated start, with a few 
immigrants from Holland, and a few from Indonesia. In October 1950, a Migration Treaty was 
signed between the governments of New Zealand and the Netherlands. The governments would 
share in moving cost for selected migrants aged between 18 and 35, who in return would have to 
perform a job assigned to them by the New Zealand government for 2 years. New Zealand would 
set a quota, 1200 men and 800 women for the first year. Immigration rapidly increased, even 
surpassing the quota, and New Zealand tightened selection in response. Participation in the 
Assisted Migration Program, as it was called, diminished, from 55% of immigrants in 1953 to 
11% in 1958, because immigrants disliked the two year job assignment and because the Dutch 
government implemented a general subsidy for emigration in 1955, and the New Zealand 
government participated in this program. In 1956, 90% of the immigrants were subsidised; the 
percentage would remain that high for a long period.  
 
- Figure 1 - 
 
Between 1955 and 1957, the Nomination System was introduced. Churches, business firms and 
the Dutch Emigration Service were allowed to have families immigrate, provided they 
guaranteed work and housing. The New Zealand government set an annual quota of 1000 
immigrants without any further restrictions. The quota usually was not exhausted, except in the 
early 1980's when the recession hit particularly hard in the Netherlands and the unemployment 
rate soared up.  
 
In 1993, the Dutch government denounced the Migration Treaty, as emigration policy was 
abolished as a government activity. As a consequence, Dutch applicants for immigration were 
subject to the general system that selects on the basis of points awarded for age, education and 
experience. By that time, Dutch immigration had already steadily diminished.   
 
Priemus (1997) notes that entrants were carefully selected, initially by the New Zealand 
authorities under the Assisted Migration Program and later by the Dutch under the Nomination  
System (under this system, an unsuccessful immigrant returned to Holland at Dutch expense). It 
was certainly not only farmers who emigrated to predominantly agricultural New Zealand.2 
While the percentage was indeed 43 in 1950, it was down to 16 in 1951 and to only 7 in 1962. 
The share of farmers among the Dutch is now comparable to that among the New Zealanders 
(some 12%). Dutch immigrants are and have been overrepresented in manufacturing and 
construction and underrepresented in commerce. The share of self-employed is quite high, at 
24% of those fully active in 1981, with a comparable 13% for the entire New Zealand active 
population. Unemployment among the Dutch was generally low, and there was some consensus 
notion that the Dutch work hard and do well. Supported both by New Zealand and by Dutch 
policies, the Dutch were keen on integration in the New Zealand society; geographically, they 
were spread all over New Zealand, and they made little attempt to cluster together. Dutch 
immigrant associations in 1997 only numbered some 1700 members at a total Dutch born 
population of 25 000. Only a small minority of the second generation speaks Dutch.  
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As the data show, in all some 41 000 Dutch immigrated to New Zealand between 1947 and 1997. 
The Dutch immigrant population numbers about 25 000 in 1997. Over the postwar period 3 000 
Dutch have died in New Zealand. Hence, out of the 41 000 some 13 000 have left the country, 
many going back to Holland, but others moving on to other immigration countries like Australia 
or Canada.  
 
Elich and Blauw (1981) is the only study that looks specifically at Dutch return migration from 
New Zealand. In 1980, they traced the return migrants from two emigrant cohorts and found that 
about a third had returned to Holland (36% for the 1970 cohort and 33% for the 1975 cohort). 
The estimate of a third squares nicely with the aggregate estimate cited above and also suggests 
that most return migration takes place in the first 5 years. Their combined Canada/ 
Australia/New Zealand sample is strongly unimodal at about 3 years after migration.  
 
Elich and Blauw asked the returned migrants for their motives to return. 'Personal problems' 
(problems with relatives back home, with the partner, children, or language) are altogether 
mentioned by 51% of the returned migrants. Among stated motives, lack of economic success is 
not dominant. 64% evaluate their migration positively and their return not negatively. Only 8% 
ex post regret their migration, 18% regret having returned. If one were to take these answers at 
face value, there would be no need for great concern for selective return migration if one studies 
economic success. But of course, stated motives may not tell the true story. 
 
- Figure 2 -  
 
As Figure 2 shows, per capita growth in The Netherlands was much stronger than in New 
Zealand, in particular up to the late 1970's. This has continuously undermined the position of 
New Zealand as an attractive destination for Dutch emigrants motivated by material welfare. 
New Zealand relative national income after 1975 hovered around a third of its 1950 value. The 
index of the real exchange rate (Dutch guilders per New Zealand dollar multiplied by New 
Zealand over Dutch price level) mirrored this development quite faithfully. The Dutch who 
moved to New Zealand in the early fifties moved to a high income country; if they stayed, this 
advantage was more than wiped out over the next decades. Those who came later, moved from a 
high income to a low income country.  
 
Income dispersion may be a particularly relevant variable to understand mobility patterns. 
Economic opportunity, the possibility to realise the market value of endowments and acquired 
skills, may differ substantially between countries, and a crude indication of such opportunities is 
given by measures of income dispersion. It has been predicted that migration from high 
dispersion to low dispersion countries will primarily consist of low skilled workers, since they in 
particular stand to gain from the move, while migration from low dispersion to high dispersion 
economies should be dominated by high skilled workers. Income inequality in the Netherlands is 
well documented3, but data on New Zealand only start in 1984. The evidence suggests that New 
Zealand has a more unequal distribution than the Netherlands. Atkinson et al (1995) give data on 
disposable income per equivalent adult. P10, the income at the lowest decile relative to the 
median, is 61.5 in the Netherlands and 53.6 in New Zealand (in 1987), and P90 is 175.0 for the 
Netherlands and 186.6 for New Zealand, giving P90/P10 ratio's of 2.85 and 3.48.  
 
Sylvia Dixon (1998) documents earnings inequality in New Zealand for the period 1984-1997. 
Inequality in hourly earnings clearly is trended upward during that period, both for men and for 
women. Applying similar calculations for The Netherlands4 shows that in the late 1980’s and 
mid 1990’s, inequality is higher in New Zealand. For emigration after the late 1980’s one would 
thus predict it to be predominantly from the top end of the earnings distribution, as they would 
have better opportunities in New Zealand than in The Netherlands. Expenditures on social 
programs among the non-aged amounted to 3% percent of GDP in New Zealand (in 1979), and 
over 12% in the Netherlands (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, Chart 2). This suggests better 
social protection at the low end in The Netherlands, and also would favour emigration from the 
top end rather than from the bottom end. It is hard to assess the situation in earlier decades, for 
simple lack of data for New Zealand. For The Netherlands, we know that inequality between the 
1950’s and the late 1980’s has declined substantially. In fact, Gould (1982, 32-36) presents some 
evidence that up until  the 1970's income inequality was larger in The Netherlands than in New 
Zealand. This would c.p. predict migration to be from the low end of the Dutch skill 
distribution.5
 
The development in aggregate unemployment rates only started to diverge after the mid-eighties. 
Until that time, both rates were low, with the Dutch rate consistently above the New Zealand 
rate. After the late seventies, both rates soared up, but the Dutch rate took a sharp decline after 
1984 and since 1989 is substantially lower than in New Zealand.  We would expect the relative 
unemployment rates also to be an important determinant of the emigration flows.  
 
 
3. Analysing the migration decision: the role of age 
 
In a present-value-maximizing framework, the comparative statics of the migration decision are 
fairly staightforward.6  However, the effect of age is not unambigious, in contrast to the genreal 
intuitive notion that migration, if considered at all, should be undertaken as young as possible. 
This is not true in general. We will spell out the effect of age in some detail and also focus on it 
in our empirical analysis. 
 
With A for age at migration, WHt for wage in homeland Holland at age t, WZAt  for wage in 
destination New Zealand at age t when migrating at age A, and defining C as the monetary 
equivalent of the once-over utility effect of moving to the destination country, the present value 
for working in the homeland until A and then emigrating reads 
 
(1)  A-A
t-
ZAt
t-
Ht eC-dteWdteW
ρρρ ∫∫ += TAAOAPV
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To find the optimum planned migration age, set the derivative to A equal to zero and rewrite: 
 (2) { dteW}e ZAt' ∫ −−− ∂∂−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+ T
A
tA
ZAA
A
A
A
A
HA A
eWC
C
CW ρρρρ   
 
The left-hand side gives the marginal benefit of increasing A: staying longer in Holland gains 
the extra wage (discounted) and postpones the incurrence of migration cost CA. The marginal 
cost of later migration, at the right-hand side, entails not receiving the New Zealand starting 
wage WZAA reduced by the effect of later migration on later wages (which is usually negative, 
hence the marginal cost is increased by additional reduction of all future wages in the destination 
country).  
 
Equation (2) allows for many results and all of them may have empirical validity, depending on 
the actual circumstances. There may be corner solutions. Marginal benefit may always be higher 
than marginal cost, and hence, there will be no migration: postponing migration always adds 
more in the homeland than in the destination country. Or the other way round: later migration 
always gives higher marginal cost than marginal benefit, and migration takes place at age zero. 
Or the curves may cross twice. Marginal cost, starting below marginal benefits, may be low 
initially if the starting wage in the destination country is not too high, increase rapidly because of 
the discounted total wage loss from later migration and then decrease because discounting 
dominates. Migration would then be planned at the first crossing. 
 
A “well-behaved” interior optimum is also conceivable. Marginal benefits starting out above 
marginal cost may decline if a high discount rate outstrips wage growth in the homeland. 
Marginal cost may increase if post-migration wages fall steeply with later migration. Under 
special conditions, there is even a very elegant implication. Suppose that destination country 
wages are not sensitive to age at migration (i.e. the term under the integral is zero). Then, the 
optimal age at migration is located where the wage gap WZAA-WHA equals the return on the 
migration cost CA : ρ  reduced by relative change in migration cost: 
(3) AC⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=−
A
'
A
HAZAA C
C
ρWW   
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There is international evidence that immigrant wages upon entry typically show a dip relative to 
natives’ wages that may be made up in subsequent years. We can easily include this effect, by 
rewriting the destination wage as a maximum potential wage at the earliest possible migration 
and a loss relative to that wage. The former may be equal to the natives' wage, but it need not. 
Hence, let's decompose the immigrant's wage profile in a wage that would be realised at age t if 
migrating at A = 0 (WZt) and a loss that is a fraction of this wage: δA,f, the fraction of this wage 
lost at age f when arriving at age A. δA,A is the initial dip, δA,f decreases for increasing f and 
reaches zero at A+F (where F is the time needed for catching up). Of course, A+F may be greater 
than T (age of retirement), and the wage never fully catches up. But for the case where A+F<T, 
and δA,A+F = 0 can be realised, we may write condition (2) for optimum planned age at migration 
as 
 
(4) { } ( ) dteWeWδ1eW tZtZAA-
'
HA
ρρρ δρ
A
C
C
C AtFA
A
A
AAA
A
A
∂
∂+−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+ ∫ +−  
 
Again, the outcome is not obvious. The unspecified age sensitivity of wages combined with 
discounting makes for unpredictable outcomes7. The impact of the Entrant wage loss on the 
optimal migration age depends on the relative magnitude of initial loss and cumulated later loss. 
Without Entrant loss (δst = 0, all s, t) and without migration cost (CA = 0), in a well-behaved 
interior solution, the planned migration age would be at WHA = WZA, assuming WZA 
(marginal cost) increases faster than WHA (marginal benefit): move as soon as the destination 
wage surpasses the homeland wage. The initial earnings dip δAA reduces marginal cost, and 
hence increases planned age of migration. But later losses (δAt) increase the marginal cost, 
and hence, decrease planned migration age. The unpredictable balance of the two determines 
the outcome.  
 
As noted, there is a general, intuitive notion that migration if considered at all, is best undertaken 
at the youngest possible age (e.g. straight after completing education, although education of 
course may also be completed abroad). But as the above analysis indicates this holds only under 
restrictive conditions8. For example, Schwartz (1976) indeed predicts that the rate of migration 
declines with age. But he imposes that the benefit from migration at a given age (the difference 
between the wage rate in both countries) declines, at every age, for any postponement of 
migration. This condition appears not to be met in our data (see later). We will return to the age-
effect in our empirical section. The effect of age on migration turns out to be complicated, and 
can only be predicted under very specific conditions, even in a deterministic framework. It may 
differ between different types of potential migrants, such as migrants between countries with 
very large wage differentials (the initial New Zealand-Netherlands comparison) and potential 
movers in an international professional labour market such as now emerging in the European 
Union.9
 
 
4. Data and descriptive analysis  
 
The Dutch dataset is the OSA sample, a national representative household panel survey. Within 
each household all members aged between 16 and 64 were interviewed. The panel started in 
1985. Attrition has been countered by selective addition of households to maintain a represen-
tative sample of the Dutch labour force. The 1986 sample contains 2452 households. We will use 
the 1986 sample, to match the New Zealand dataset for that year.  
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The New Zealand dataset is derived from the 1986 Population Census. It includes the whole 
population of working age migrants (those aged 15-64), and a 5 percent random sample of the 
New Zealand born working age population. Immigrants are identified by their country of birth 
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rather than by their residence status (i.e. they could have adopted New Zealand citizenship, be 
permanent residents or on temporary permits). Visitors are excluded from the sample. We 
preferred the 1986 Census to later Census years, since most Dutch immigration took place in the 
1950s and the number of enumerated Dutch migrants declines steadily over time (The overall 
number of Dutch working age immigrants fell from 20196 in 1986 to 15153 in 1996). 
 
- Figure 3 - 
 
The sample distribution by year of arrival is fairly uniform except for a marked peak in the 
period 1951-1954. The age distribution by arrival year as we observe it in our sample is 
transformed asymmetrically by mortality and is truncated because of the age restriction in the 
sample (15-64). This is shown clearly in Figure 3. For arrival cohorts between the mid-forties 
and the mid-seventies, the average age at arrival is quite stable at about 20 to 22. For older and 
younger arrival cohorts the sample truncation ages affect the average age. For older cohorts still 
to be in the sample, they must have come at younger and younger ages (if you go backwards), for 
more recent cohorts they cannot be included if they are too young. For older cohorts, average age 
moves up from the upper boundary constraint, for younger cohorts average age moves up from 
the lower boundary. Conditioning on arrival cohort we observe that most immigrants have come 
at young ages. But there is still a fair amount of dispersion and the arrival age is not uniquely low 
as for example schooling ages are. In the latest cohort (arrival between 1977 and 1986), almost 
30% of the immigrants arrived at ages above 34. The "moving boundary" does not create an 
additional problem of endogenous sample selection. The only endogenous sample selection rule 
is the immigration decision. A person born before 1922 cannot be in the immigrant sample in 
1986, because he is then over 64. Anyone born after 1972 cannot be in the sample, because in 
1986 he is under 15. But those born before 1922 or after 1972 cannot be in the non-migrant 
sample either, for the same reason. There is no additional endogenous selection problem. 
   
The samples are characterised in the Appendix. The Dutch in New Zealand are old both relative 
to Dutch in The Netherlands and to the native New Zealanders, reflecting the presence of a large 
stock of older immigrants, i.e. the reduction of immigration flows in later years. On average the 
immigrants have been in New Zealand for some 22 to 23 years. The Dutch in New Zealand work 
substantially more hours than the Dutch in the Netherlands, reflecting their adjustment to the 
New Zealand standard. The immigrants are disproportionately selfemployed, calling for separate 
analyses of employees and selfemployed. They also have lower unemployment rates than native 
New Zealanders. Similarly, male migrants have on average a substantial income advantage of 16 
log-points over native men. For women, the opposite is observed as the average income of a 
migrant woman is 7 log–points below the income of a native woman. These comparisons are 
problematic, of course, as they are not adjusted for differences in age, education, and other 
factors. Also, a direct comparison between Dutch and New Zealand income is not meaningful, 
first, because incomes are measured in local currency, and second, because Dutch numbers give 
gross monthly income whereas the New Zealand numbers give the gross annual income.   
 
The share of Dutch male immigrants in agriculture is much higher than in The Netherlands, but it 
is quite close to the New Zealander's share. Female immigrants are more active in agriculture 
than native New Zealand women. The Dutch in New Zealand have substantially less education 
than the Dutch in the Netherlands. This fits in with the hypothesis on the relation between the 
skill level of migrants in relation to income dispersion. Since schooling levels have risen 
considerably over time, we considered education levels by age interval, and then the relation still 
holds: in all intervals, migrants have less education than non-migrants.  
 
In our empirical analyses, we will only consider employees. We are compelled to ignore the 
issue of selectivity as an employee rather than being self-employed. The dataset simply does not 
contain variables that relate to self-employment status without affecting earnings. Moreover, 
properly measuring earnings from self-employment is quite problematic.     
 
 
5. Empirical Modelling of migrants’ wages: selected issues 
 
In this section we discuss the joint modelling of wages of non-migrants (the Dutch in the 
Netherlands), migrants (Dutch-born residents of New Zealand), and the decision to migrate. 
A natural starting point is a canonical switching regression model with normality (e.g., Roy, 
1951, Quandt, 1972). We show that the extreme imbalance between migrants and non-
migrants reduces the usefulness of this model in the context of international migration. In our 
view, this issue has not received sufficient attention in the previous literature.  
 
Given the empirical limitations for modelling selection on unobservables, we then focus our 
analysis on measuring selection on observables. Furthermore, we introduce a non-standard 
model for the migration equation in form of a discrete-time hazard model for the decision to 
migrate at age t. Because for each person, calendar time and age move synchronously, the 
discrete-time hazard model offers a straightforward way to introduce macro-economic 
variables.  
 
To see why the switching regression model is ill-suited in the present context, consider the 
following standard set-up  
 
(5)  W x uHi i H Hi= +'β  
(6)  W x uZi i Z Zi= +'β  
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i(7)  M z ui i
* '= +γ  
 
where WHi is the (logarithmic) wage in the homeland (Holland) and WZi is the (logarithmic) 
wage in the destination country (New Zealand), and ui, uHi and uZi have a trivariate normal 
distribution with mean vector zero and non-zero covariances σHu, σZu and σHZ. WHi is 
observed for non-migrants and WZi for migrants so that we have 
 
(8)  W M W M Wi i Zi i Hi= + −( )1
 
where and WM Mi i= ≥1( * 0) i is the observed wage. Unless there is statistical independence 
between the error in the migration equation and the error in the wage equation, separate 
estimation of each wage equation on the subset of observed wages will produce biased 
estimates of β. Two-stage or FML estimation of the joint model avoids this bias. Moreover, it 
potentially provides valuable information on the type of selection on unobservables. This 
information can be of substantive independent interest (i.e.,  as it may reveal something about 
the “quality-effects” of immigration policy). Of course, all inferences depend on the validity 
of the maintained model. As we show now, the model may be seriously deficient if the size of 
the populations observed in each of the two regimes is very unequal. 
 
Migration to New Zealand is a very rare event. The Netherlands have a population of around 
15 million, about 2/3 of which is of working age. In 1986 there were approximately 20,000 
Dutch working-age migrants in New Zealand, i.e., the ratio of migrants to non-migrants is 1 
to 500 and the unconditional probability of being a migrant is 0.2 percent. Under normality, 
the expected wage in Holland for those who stay can be written as  
 
(9) E W u z x
z
zHi i i i H
Hu
u
i
i
( | )
( )
( )
' '
'
'< − = − −γ β
σ
σ
φ γ
γ1 Φ  
 
where φ and Φ are the density and cumulative density functions of the standard normal 
distribution, respectively. The denominator of the last term gives the probability of staying in 
Holland. It depends on the value of the index function . Ideally, if the migration equation 
could perfectly discriminate between movers and non-movers, the probability should be very 
close to one for those who actually stay (i.e., the index function approaches minus infinity). 
In the absence of good instruments, such as in the extreme case of a constant only migration 
equation, the probability of staying must approach the proportion of stayers in the population, 
the aforementioned 0.998, again almost one. Moreover 
zi
' γ
 
(10) lim
( )
( )'
'
'z
i
ii
z
zγ
φ γ
γ→ −∞ − =1 0Φ  
 
Hence, the overall conditional expectation in (9) that is consistent with the data approaches 
zero. For the typical individual, conditional and unconditional expectations are 
approximately the same, regardless of the correlation between the migration equation and the 
wage equation and the quality of the selection equation. Less formally, since most people are 
non-migrants, the stayer condition cannot be very binding on average. As a u zi i< − ' γ
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11
)consequence, the conditional expectation and the marginal expectation 
 are almost the same. 
E u u zHi i i( |
'< − γ
E E u uHi i[ ( | )] = 0
 
While this result does not matter much for the interpretation of the results of non-migrants 
(indeed - who ever reported a national earnings function with correction for selective 
outmigration?), it gives rise to extraordinary counterfactual wages of movers. In particular, 
consider the counter-factual wage equation of migrants had they stayed in Holland. Again, 
using the standard formula, it holds that 
(11) E W u z x
z
zHi i i i H
Hu
u
i
i
( | )
( )
( )
' '
'
'≥ − = +γ β
σ
σ
φ γ
γΦ  
 
The denominator of the second expression now gives the probability of being a migrant. As 
before, the expression depends on the value of the index function . Two extreme cases 
are possible. In a first case, the migration equation perfectly discriminates between migrants 
and non-migrants. The probability of migration for migrants is close to one, and the 
counterfactual wage (11) is approximately equal to the wage of non-migrants. In practice 
more relevant is a second case, in which the migration equation discriminates poorly between 
migrants and non-migrants. In the extreme, no suitable instruments are at hand and all the 
selection is on unobservables. With a constant probability of being a migrant, in our case 
0.002 (the proportion of migrants in the Dutch population), the value of the Mills ratio in (11) 
exceeds 3 and selection effects are large even for moderate values of 
zi
' γ
σ σHu u/ . 
 
The underlying mechanism can also be illustrated by considering the conditional expectation 
function of the bivariate normal which is linear: 
 
E W u x uHi i i H
Hu
u
i( | )
'= +β σσ 2  
 
One immediate result is that ifσ  is nonzero, then goes to negative or positive 
infinity as u
Hu E W uHi i( | )
i goes to infinity. In the limit, for any distribution of , if the probability of 
migration goes to zero, then only those with arbitrarily large values of u
zi
' γ
i decide to migrate 
and the conditional expectation will go to positive or negative infinity by the linearity of the 
conditional expectation for bivariate normal distributions, unless the covariance is zero.  
 
For non-limit considerations, the magnitude of the overall selection effect depends on the 
absolute value of the ratio . In order to calibrate a range of possible magnitudes of 
this ratio, one has to be more specific about the nature of the migration decision. In the 
classical Roy model, as applied for instance by Borjas (1987) to the migration decision, 
people act on income gains net of migration cost, i.e., . 
σ σHu u/
M x C u ui i Z H i Zi Hi
* ' ( )= − − +β β -  
First, assume that migration cost are constant and that and are perfectly correlated, 
i.e. . The latter assumption may be a reasonable approximation for migration 
between two OECD countries, as conjectured by Borjas (1987) (formally, the correlation is 
not identified in the switching regression model since individuals are never observed in both 
states). Then  
uZ uH 
σ σ σHZ H Z=
 
(12) 
σ
σ
σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
Hu
u
HZ H
H HZ Z
Z Hsqrt
= −− + = −
2
2 22( )
(sgn[ ]) H  
 
In the Dutch/New Zealand scenario this means that for a value of σ , say, the 
counterfactual wages of migrants in the Netherlands will be 150 log points below or above 
those of an average Dutch worker. To us, such large selection effects are completely 
implausible. To “rescue” the model, one can introduce individual heterogeneity in migration 
cost, for instance due to differences in psychological disposition. The mere geographic 
distance between the Netherlands and New Zealand means that it is difficult to maintain close 
family ties after migration. Life-style may be a more important consideration to others. Now 
H = 05.
 
(13) 
σ
σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
Hu
u
HZ H HC
H Z C HZ HC ZCsqrt
= − −+ + − − +
2
2 2 2 2 2 2( )
 
 
Thus, the model can be reconciled with the data if the migration decision is largely driven by 
migration cost. If migration costs have a large variance and are mostly unrelated to wages 
( ), then the ratio (13) will be close to zero. But in this case, the switching 
regression model is driven mainly by an exogenous factor and the case for joint estimation is 
less compelling in the first place.  
σ σHC ZC= = 0
 
To summarize, the strong assumptions of the switching regression model with normality has 
implications that are a-priori implausible in our application. One might attempt to salvage the 
model by choosing other error distributions. We don’t think, however, that this approach is 
promising. Rather, we take the migration decision to be exogenous with respect to wages and 
consequently report single equation estimates of (5)-(7),  thereby addressing the other aspect 
of immigration choice, selection on observables.  
 
In doing so, we use some non-standard functions for equations (6) and (7) in order to obtain 
as much information as possible. For migrants, we modify the standard earnings function,  
 
(14)  W ys t ti i i i= + + + +β β β β0 1 2 3 2 ui
 
where “ys” stands for years of schooling and “t” for age. Using the identity t=A+(t-A), where 
(t-A) is years since migration, i.e., experience in the New Zealand labor market, it follows 
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that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
u
i
  
(15)  W ys A t A A t A A t AZi i i i i i i i i i Zi= + + + − + + − + − +γ γ γ γ γ γ γ0 1 2 3 4 2 5 2 6( ) ( ) ( )
 
This generalization makes it possible to distinguish between the returns to experience gained 
in the Netherlands before migration and the returns to experience in New Zealand, as in the 
model in section 3. The two are the same as long as γ2 = γ3 and 2γ4 = 2γ5 = γ6, a set of 
restrictions that can be tested. In the more general model, age-earnings profiles depend on the 
age at arrival in New Zealand, just as we discussed in section 3. For instance, one can test 
whether the earnings dip is larger for older migrants who experience relatively faster 
subsequent earnings growth than younger migrants. 
 
To explicitly account for age-dependence of the migration decision, as laid out in section 3 of 
our paper, we model the duration until migration using a discrete time hazard model with 
time-varying covariates (e.g., Allison, 1984). The risk set includes all people of a certain age 
who have not yet migrated by that age. The decision of moving to New Zealand at age A, 
given that a person lived in Holland up to age A-1, is assumed to be determined by the latent 
model 
 
(16) M A x x A c ut i i i i i= + + + + >1 01 1 2 2 if h( ) ( )β β  
 
h(A) measures the variation in the hazard over the life-cycle. Two parameterizations are 
considered. In a first, h(A) is a fourth-order polynomial in A. In a second, an age specific 
intercept is estimated without further restriction. x1 are age invariant variables such as gender 
and education (which is assumed to be completed before the decision to migrate is made). 
x2(A + c) includes indicators of the relative economic conditions in the two countries at the 
time of migration (c is the cohort (birth year) such that A + c is the year of migration). 
 
For estimation, we generate a combined sample of Dutch in the Netherlands and Dutch in 
New Zealand. The first group constitutes the part of the risk group that never migrated. For 
each age (beyond 15) a separate record is created. For instance, for a Dutch resident aged 40 
in 1986, it is known that she did not migrate at age 20, nor at age 21, or 22 and so forth. The 
decision-relevant variables at age 20 were her personal (invariant) characteristics and the 
macro-conditions in 1966. The comparison group is made up of people who did migrate at 
age A. These are only included once, at the age they came to New Zealand. In principle, pre-
migration observations of migrants (when they were aged A - 1, A - 2,...)  could be included 
in the risk set. However, migrants are over-sampled, whereas the Dutch sample is 
representative for the population in the Netherlands, and therefore more appropriate. 
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6. Results 
 
- Table 1 -  
 
We start out, in Table 1, with a standard "assimilation" earnings function for New Zealand, 
where we include natives and immigrants in one regression equation, with a dummy for 
migrants, for men and for women.10  Returns to schooling are about 7%. The effect of potential 
experience (age minus schooling minus 6) is virtually log-linear and markedly lower for women. 
The position of women further deviates from that for men with a penalty for marriage rather than 
a bonus. This clearly suggests that married women are restricted in their choices compared to 
single women. 11
 
The migrant earnings dip is substantial12, at 15 to over 30%, and a catch-up rate on years since 
migration that is too slow to ever really make up for the loss13. Note that even for the best 
migrants, the prospects are poor. If we take "best" to mean an initial earnings loss two standard 
deviations smaller than the average migrant and a catch-up rate two standard deviations higher, 
these ”best” men and women would still need some 30 years of New Zealand experience to wipe 
out the gap.   
 
- Table 2 - 
 
In Table 2 we compare earnings for the Dutch who choose to remain in Holland and for those 
who migrated to New Zealand. Rates of return to schooling are higher in Holland than in New 
Zealand, so we expect migrants to be lower educated. The prediction of predominantly lower 
educated to migrate is borne out in the statistics we discussed earlier. Note that the lower returns 
to schooling only hold for migrants: New Zealanders in New Zealand have a higher return than 
Dutch in Holland. The lower return to schooling for migrants in New Zealand than in The 
Netherlands has an interesting implication: the penalty for dropping out from school is lower in 
New Zealand. Often, the argument is made that in countries like New Zealand, less regulated 
than The Netherlands, it is easier to make a career without a school diploma. While we have no 
results specifically for school drop-outs the results suggest that in relative terms there may be 
some validity in the argument. Proficiency in the English language is not included in the 
equation as this question was not contained in the 1986 census. Moreover, we know from the 
1996 census, where a self-evaluation was given, that virtually all Dutch immigrants claim good 
proficiency (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). The marriage premium for men is lower in 
Holland, for women it is higher in Holland, generating the expectation that male migrants will be 
married, while female migrants will not.  
 
- Figure 4 - 
 
Dutch experience is about equally rewarded in the Netherlands and in New Zealand, but at a 
substantially lower rate for women than for men. This implies that the migrant earnings ratio 
between New Zealand and The Netherlands (New Zealand earnings at entry relative to earnings 
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left behind in Holland) is not sensitive to age at migration. The returns to experience gained in 
New Zealand are higher than the New Zealand returns to Dutch experience. Both for men and for 
women, the difference is about one percentage point per year. For men, age at migration has a 
substantial effect on returns to New Zealand experience. As the interaction term indicates, 
migrating ten years later reduces the returns to New Zealand experience by some two percentage 
points per year. Yet, putting all things together, in levels there is only a modest effect of  later 
migration (Figure 4).  For women, the effect of later migration on earnings growth is negligible. 
     
- Table 3 - 
 
In Table 3 we present a probit analysis for the country of residence: the decision to have 
migrated and not returned to Holland. We used population weights for the observations, as the 
Dutch sample of non-migrants (OSA) is relatively much smaller than the sample of Dutch 
migrants in New Zealand (see section 4). As anticipated, we find a negative effect of schooling 
(significant only for women), reinforced by the negative effect of having a professional (high-
education) occupation. Also as anticipated, we find a strong positive effect of having an 
agricultural occupation. The effect of macroeconomic conditions in the two countries perfectly 
matches theoretical predictions: unemployment in Holland stimulates emigration, unemployment 
in New Zealand reduces it, and a high relative income in New Zealand also stimulates 
emigration.  
 
- Figure 5 - 
 
In Figure 5, we have plotted the probability to migrate by age as implied by the estimated probit 
model. Without controls, the probability peaks just before age 25, when we standardize by taking 
the age effect net of controls we find a much flatter age pattern, and a peak shifted upwards by 
several years. Note that this is at variance with the notion of migrating as young as possible, and 
an inclination to migrate that falls continuously with age, as Schwartz (1976) claimed. The age 
effect on migration is certainly not unequivocal, just as we anticipated in section 3.  
 
 
7.  So, did they fare well? 
 
With our estimation results available, we will now give a partial answer to the question that 
motivated our paper: how well off is a migrant due to migration? For the wage structures 
observed in 1986, we calculated net present values of lifetime wages, discounted at 10%. We use 
a standard immigrant: male14, married, 10 years of schooling, migrating at age 20 in 1950. All 
annual earnings are converted into Dutch guilders. The conversion factor we use is the ratio of 
average nominal per capita GDP in New Zealand evaluated at the exchange rate of the year in 
which earnings are assumed to have been generated, to average nominal per capita GDP in 
Holland, normalized so that the value is one in 1986 (when we observe the data). That is, we take 
the wage structures in each country as observed in our 1986 regression and adjust them for each 
country to particular years by applying the index of the country's average income, thus assuming 
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that nominal wage growth does not disturb the 1986 wage structure. This gives us an indication 
of the present values of nominal incomes that actually accrued (or would have accrued in the 
other country). We don't correct for inflation: in the migration analysis, only relative inflation in 
both countries is relevant, and this is accounted for in our conversion.15 We also make a 
calculation where we freeze the conversion factor at the value for 1950, the presumed year of 
migration: this may serve as an indication of what migrants could have anticipated at unchanged 
1986 wage structure and relative income levels constant for the rest of their working lives. 
Results are collected in Table 4.  
 
- Table 4 - 
 
Our typical male migrant may have anticipated a substantial gain in lifetime earnings from his 
move to New Zealand. At the wage structures in 1986 (the only ones we observed) and the 
conversion factor for per capita incomes in 1950, he thought to more than double his present 
value. The actual aggregate development was quite a deception, as his lifetime earnings in New 
Zealand were 25% lower than he might have anticipated in 1950. Yet, over the course of his life, 
the 1950 migrant is still better off, with lifetime earnings 75% higher in New Zealand than in 
The Netherlands. The gains in the early years have been high enough to outweigh the strong 
deterioration that occurred during the postwar period. 
 
- Figures 6a, 6b - 
 
We have further analysed the age effect on migration in Figure 6. In line with the analysis of the 
effect of age at migration in section 3, we calculated two present values for a standard migrant 
(as in Table 4). For any given age at migration A, we calculate the present value of earnings up 
to age A in homeland Holland, and the present value of earnings beyond age A in destination 
country New Zealand (all discounted back to 0, i.e. age 20). Both curves are calculated in their 
national currencies. As Figure 6a and b indicate, present value in Holland continuously increases 
with later migration, present value in New Zealand continuously declines with later migration. 
Total lifetime present value, for any age of switching from Holland to New Zealand, depends on 
the conversion rate of the two currencies (the relative weight of the two curves). In panel a, we 
use the 1950 conversion rate: 1 New Zealand dollar is 5.3 Dutch guilders. At that conversion 
rate, lifetime earnings monotonically decrease with advancing age of migration: the best decision 
is to migrate when starting working life. In panel b, with the 1986 conversion rate (1:1), lifetime 
earnings increase monotonically when postponing migration: the best decision is never to 
migrate. Implicitly, somewhere between 1950 and 1986 the conversion rate development 
switched the optimum from 'go young' to 'go never'. Conceptually, as anticipated in section 3, the 
present value curves might have determined an interior solution for the optimal migration age. 
The actual present value curves turn out to be modestly non-linear and generate no parabolic 
shape for the aggregate. 
 
The switch of the optimum decision for a typical male individual, from migration to no migration 
reiterates the results we obtained earlier in this paper, and anticipated in our introduction.16 The 
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ex post rationality of a 1950 migrant, in spite of the clear deterioration of New Zealand's relative 
income level surprised us. Of course, the calculations are buried under a load of special 
assumptions, and there may be much more individual variety than we could uncover. As a 
partial check on our results, we can compare with outcomes of a survey we organised among 
Dutch immigrants in New Zealand, by including a questionnaire in the newsletter of the 
federation of Dutch immigrant associations in late 1999. Unfortunately, response was modest 
and heavily dominated by the retired. We will elsewhere analyse the data in detail, but it is 
interesting to take a few results from that survey. The sample size of the survey is 646, of 
which 60% had retired. Almost half of the respondents had a position waiting for them when 
they moved to New Zealand. The earnings gap relative to the position they left behind in 
Holland, according to the respondent’s recollection, was very dispersed, but fairly 
symmetrically so. One quarter of them answered they experienced a drop of 25% or more, 
and almost another quarter gained 25% or more. 12% stayed about even, the intervals in 
between each took up roughly 10% (and 15% don’t remember). Settling in certainly has not 
been easy, and fully three quarters of the respondents at some point had seriously considered 
returning. On average, it took respondents 6 years to get the feeling they had really settled in. 
For 45% it took no more than three years, for 71% no more than 5 years. Seriously 
considering to return is widely dispersed over years after arrival, but peaks at one and two 
years (11 and 14 %); half of the respondents have their heartache within five years17 of 
arrival. This matches up with the observation that most return migration takes place within 
five years of arrival.  
 
And how do the immigrants evaluate their move? In terms of income and financial wealth, 
the answers divide roughly equally over the three possible answers: 'I am better off than I 
would have been', 'about equal',  'I am worse off'. In a simple ordered probit regression, the 
perceived relative financial position deteriorates with year of arrival (holding age constant), 
i.e. those who arrived later are more likely to find themselves worse off than they would have 
been in Holland. This is precisely the conclusion we draw from Figure 6. However, in overall 
quality of life, almost three quarters indicate that they are better off, and almost a quarter 
feels it’s about the same as it might have been in Holland (only 6% feels worse off). While 
these answers are obviously coloured by selectivity and cognitive dissonance, they also 
reiterate the relevance of the broad comparison we set up in equation (1): it’s not just wages 
that determine migration decisions.18 This also supports our emphasis on "migration  cost" 
rather than wage in the discussion of selectivity correction. However, including observations 
on such non-pecuniary cost and benefits is not easy, if only for simple lack of accessible data.  
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Table 1. New Zealand Earnings Functions: Immigrants and Natives.  
 
   
 Men Women 
   
Years of Schooling 0.0665 0.0742 
 (0.0010) (0.0020) 
Experience 0.0645 0.0324 
 (0.0009) (0.0016) 
Experience squared -0.0011 -0.0005 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married 0.2073 -0.2868 
 (0.0074) (0.0124 
Immigrant -0.1528 -0.3150 
 (0.0154) (0.0317) 
Years of migration 0.0028 0.0054 
 (0.0006) (0.0014) 
Constant 8.3214 8.2723 
 (0.0128) (0.0245) 
Observations 33222 24732 
R-squaredNumber of observations 0.35 0.08 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
Source: OSA 1986 and New Zealand Census 1986. All employees. No weights. Dependent variable is 
logarithmic annual earnings. 
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Table 2. Earnings Functions for Dutch in The Netherlands and Dutch in New Zealand.a  
 
 
Men 
in NL 
Men 
in NZ 
Men 
in NZ 
Women 
in NL 
Women 
in NZ 
Women 
in NZ 
       
       
Years of schooling 0.0575 0.0454 0.0446 0.0680 0.0597 0.0586 
 (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0102) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Experience 0.0488 0.0546  0.0089 0.0152  
 (0.0027) (0.0023)  (0.0074) (0.0052)  
Experience squared -0.0008 -0.0009  -0.0004 -0.0002  
 (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.0002) (0.0001)  
Married 0.1397 0.2142 0.2128 -0.2663 -0.3745 -0.3548 
 (0.0214) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0518) (0.0398) (0.0398) 
NL Experience   0.0522   0.0115 
   (0.0023)   (0.0052) 
NL Experience squ.   -0.0006   -0.0003 
   (0.0001)   (0.0001) 
NZ Experience    0.0620   0.0247 
   (0.0031)   (0.0076) 
NZ Experience squ.   -0.0010   -0.0003 
   (0.0001)   (0.0002) 
NL Exp. * NZ Exp.   -0.0019   -0.0005 
   (0.0001)   (0.0002) 
Constant 6.3395 8.5698 8.4556 6.3220 8.4713 8.3716 
 (0.0450) (0.0355) (0.0395) (0.1381) (0.0861) (0.0980) 
Observations 1485 6203 6203 803 3184 3184 
R-squared 0.42 0.22 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.07 
 
a  Earnings in The Netherlands is monthly income in Dutch guilders, earnings in New Zealand is 
annual income in New Zealand dollars. Dependent variable is log earnings. Standards errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3. Decision to emigrate at Age A: Probit Results (Discrete Time Hazard Model; 
Employees Only) 
 
   
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
     
Years of Schooling -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0290 -0.0286 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Unemployment in Holland 0.0566 0.0554 0.0428 0.0423 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0055) (0.0056) 
Unemployment in New Zealand -0.0619 -0.0603 -0.0297 -0.0285 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
Relative Income 1.7815 1.7669 1.9467 1.9636 
 (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0531) (0.0535) 
Occupation: Professional -0.0562 -0.0549 -0.1710 -0.1749 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0283) (0.0284) 
Occupation: Service -0.1011 -0.1006 -0.2387 -0.2400 
 (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0219) (0.0220) 
Occupation: Agriculture 0.4200 0.4176 0.3061 0.3017 
 (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0415) (0.0418) 
      
Age polynomial  yes no yes no 
Age dummies no yes no yes 
     
Log-likelihood -43692.2 -43595.6 -13401.9 -13338.9 
     
 
Notes: Sample: Male, age >15,  the reference category is blue collar jobs. 
All models are estimated using population weights 
 
 
 
Table 4. Net present-values with and without migration for Dutch males aged 20 in 1950 
in Dutch Guilders  
 
 
 
Net present value in The Netherlands 
 
50240 
Net present value in New Zealand, converted at 1950 
exchange rate 
 
118131 
Net present value in New Zealand, converted at current 
(yearly) exchange rates 
 
87831 
  
Note: Computations are based on columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 (men). The discount rate is 10 percent. The 
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hypothetical worker is married and has 10 years of schooling.  
Figure 1. 
Dutch Immigrants Entering New Zealand
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Figure 2. Nominal per Capita Income in New Zealand Relative to Nominal per Capita 
income in The Netherlands and Real Exchange Rate   
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Figure 3. Sample Mean Age at Arrival by Year of Arrival (Dutch Working-Age 
Immigrants in 1986 Census) 
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Figure 4. Predicted Male Earnings Profiles 
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Figure 5. Probability of migration by age, polynomial  
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Figure 6.  Net Present Values, by Age at Migration, Netherlands and New Zealand 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Male   Female  
 NL NZ_mig NZ_nat NL NZ_mig NZ_nat 
       
       
Age 38.484 46.293 34.565 36.278 43.858 34.826 
 (11.314) (12.701) (13.897) (11.109) (12.848) (13.885) 
Years since Migration  23.543   21.528  
  (11.310)   (11.218)  
Hours of work 39.401 45.623 45.396 27.665 32.695 34.384 
 (7.423) (12.624) (12.805) (13.510) (16.484) (14.725) 
Selfemployed 0.065 0.349 0.220 0.047 0.211 0.100 
 (0.246) (0.477) (0.414) (0.211) (0.408) (0.300) 
Not in Labor Force 0.096 0.127 0.129 0.511 0.448 0.367 
 (0.294) (0.333) (0.335) (0.500) (0.497) (0.482) 
Unemployed 0.050 0.026 0.046 0.053 0.044 0.059 
 (0.219) (0.160) (0.210) (0.225) (0.205) (0.236) 
Part-time Work 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.204 0.188 0.160 
 (0.194) (0.197) (0.197) (0.403) (0.390) (0.367) 
Full-time Work 0.815 0.806 0.784 0.231 0.320 0.414 
 (0.388) (0.395) (0.411) (0.422) (0.466) (0.493) 
No Qualification 0.088 0.214 0.404 0.091 0.280 0.440 
 (0.283) (0.410) (0.491) (0.287) (0.449) (0.496) 
University Qualification 0.191 0.067 0.064 0.120 0.037 0.039 
 (0.393) (0.250) (0.244) (0.325) (0.188) (0.194) 
Years of Schooling 11.423 10.486 9.324 10.954 9.693 8.901 
 (2.688) (2.736) (3.068) (2.405) (2.624) (2.845) 
Logarithmic Income 7.677 9.718 9.552 6.909 8.676 8.747 
 (0.372) (0.720) (0.879) (0.680) (1.129) (1.109) 
Married 0.831 0.807 0.572 0.806 0.804 0.608 
 (0.375) (0.394) (0.495) (0.396) (0.397) (0.488) 
Professional 0.284 0.232 0.186 0.318 0.214 0.198 
 (0.451) (0.422) (0.389) (0.466) (0.410) (0.398) 
Service Worker 0.289 0.206 0.227 0.600 0.542 0.600 
 (0.453) (0.404) (0.419) (0.490) (0.498) (0.490) 
Agricultural Worker 0.031 0.139 0.144 0.012 0.122 0.082 
 (0.174) (0.346) (0.351) (0.109) (0.328) (0.274) 
Blue Collar Worker 0.396 0.423 0.443 0.070 0.122 0.120 
 (0.489) (0.494) (0.497) (0.256) (0.327) (0.325) 
       
Number of observations 2027 11677 43795 2067 8519 43745 
Table gives the sample means; standard deviations in parentheses.   
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Sources: New Zealand Census 1986 (see Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998); OSA 1986 (available from OSA, 
Tilburg University) 
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Endnotes 
 
1 This section is based on Priemus, 1997. The general history of New Zealand immigration is 
reviewed and analysed in Winkelmann (2001a). 
2 In the 1950's, the big difference in industrial employment composition was for men in agriculture 
and manufacturing; the share of services was equal in both counties. For males, agriculture counted 
for 20% of employment in New Zealand in 1956, and for 13% in The Netherlands in 1960. 
Manufacturing counted for 24% in New Zealand and 33% in The Netherlands. Other shares in one-
digit composition were virtually identical in both countries. For women, the compositions barely 
differed between the two countries. Sources: New Zealand Census 1956; Netherlands Census 1960. 
3 Hartog and Veenbergen (1981).  
4 We are grateful to Jeroen Smits, now at NIVROM, for his calculations. 
5 We are grateful to Jacques Poot, Victoria University at Wellington for this reference. 
6 Theoretical analysis of migration in general is given by Borjas (1999), focussing on selectivity 
effects according to the Roy model. Unobserved heterogeneity complicates the analysis. We will 
consider the Roy model in section 5. 
7 The model is formally exactly equal to a model for the optimal planned age of maternity, with the 
same problem of an initial dip δAA and possible later catching up. For example, Wetzels (1999) 
predicts maximum postponement of the birth of the first child from a model where δA, A+F = 0 (always 
return to the no-maternity wage) and where the loss fraction δAF is not sensitive to the age at which 
labour market withdrawal starts (δAF is not sensitive to A). 
8 In CEPR Discussion Paper 2596 underlying this paper we also analysed a model where individuals 
at any age decide whether to migrate or not. The same ambiquity of the age effect results. In that 
model, the effect of the discount rate is also shown to be undetermined a priori. 
9 It may also be different for migrants who intend to return to their homeland, but we consider this to 
be less relevant for our case. On return migration, see Røed (2000) and Dustman and Kirchkamp 
(2001). 
10 Preferably, one would use hourly earnings as dependent variable. We did run such regressions, but 
many wages when turned into hourly rates were implausible (from a minimum of 0.1 dollar per hour 
to a maximum of 800 dollar per hour. Truncation of extreme values leads to results very sensitive to 
the points of truncation. We therefore decided to proceed with a simple robust specification. We may 
add that in an earlier specification, with log hours added as dependent variable, our final conclusions 
(section 7) were no different.  
11 We only employ a limited number of explanatory variables, to avoid endogeneity problems as much 
as possible. 
12 The standard practice of interpreting predicted mean log-differences as percentage differences in 
means between groups is incorrect if the groups have unequal distribution of the dependent variable, 
as the transformation from mean log x to mean x is affected by dispersion of x as well. See 
Winkelmann (2001b). There is some evidence that, for men, wages of Dutch migrants are less 
dispersed than wages of New Zealand-born workers. The standard practice thus tends to 
underestimate the true percentage difference. 
13 This result is similar to Winkelmann (2000), using the same dataset.  
14 In 1950, with virtually zero participation rate for married women, male earnings will dominate in 
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the migration decision. 
15 Our conversion is incorrect insofar as the price ratio between tradables and non-tradables develops 
differently between the two countries.  
16 Anticipated lifetime present values by age (year) of migration might be included in the migration 
probit. However, with relative national income per capita we already have included a key determinant 
of this comparison. 
17  The typing error of 'five tears' had great poetic charm, but alas, even when writing about drama we 
have to remain clinical.  
18 As pointed out to us by Jacques Poot, a study by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs in 1981 
found that relative to emigrants with destination Canada and Australia, emigrants to New Zealand put 
highest weight on environmental quality as a motive for their choice. 
